Why Appease Hitler?

Why did Britain and France try to appease Hitler prior to WWII?

 In 1938, Britain and France signed the Munich Agreement with Germany, which allowed for the annexation of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. This was an historical act of appeasement and there were various reasons why both Britain and France allowed for it. For instance, many Britons saw Hitler as a possible ally against Russian communism, and the British Labour party also wanted to spend more money on infrastructure rather than on the military. In France, there was also the psychological fear of another war in Europe. France's landscape had been severely scarred by the First World War, and it was no surprise that there was a fear of repeating such an event.

  Though these are legitimate reasons for France and Britain appeasing Hitler, they are not the most significant ones.

  The largest factors that lead to the signing of the Munich agreement were: Hitler's remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the state of the European economy, Britain's lack of reliable allies, and the growing sympathy towards Germany in the British public.

The French Maginot Line

  In 1936 Hitler took a great risk and moved his troops to the Rhineland. This helped to secure an area of great strategic importance to him. The Rhineland was the easiest route between France and Germany, this was precisely why Germany had been forbidden to place troops there as per the Locarno Treaty. Because of this, Germany had not placed troops in the area since World War One. According to the treatise, an act of this nature would be "regarded as a hostile act... and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world". Such a risky move held grave implications for Germany, as it could have been met with completely justified aggression from neighbouring European countries. However, due to various psychological and economic factors, France did nothing. Hitler had gambled, and it had paid off. Had Europe responded to this act "Germany's chances in the event of a full scale attack were hopeless" (Robertson, 2001, pp. 79).

  Hitler was well aware of the strategic importance of the Rhineland, and it was made clear by the German foreign office that "until the Rhineland had been digested no active steps would be taken in foreign affairs... Once the western frontier had been fortified and the countries of Central Europe understood that France could not invade Germany at will, things would change." (Carr, 1972, pp. 70). France had recognised this threat from Germany since the early 30's, this prompted them to work on constructing the great 'Manginot line'. However this was not enough, and the "comforting shelter of her fortresses" has distracted the French from the very real need for an active standing army. (Roberts, 2001, pp.283)

Now that there was no easy means of entering Germany and preventing misdemeanors, the French government finally realised that their greatest leverage had been lost. Any future diplomacy with Germany would have to take this into account.

  The next large factor was the state of the European economy. Most countries throughout Europe and the world were still feeling the effects of the great depression which occurred in 1929 and had lasted throughout the 30's. Britain was suffering due to her reliance on international trade, which was still recovering from the war time disorganisation. By September 1932, unemployment in Britain had risen to a staggering 3.75 million (Thomson, 1965, pp.130-131).

  France was an anomaly in this respect, while Britain and the United States had experienced the economic depression at that time, France would not feel the effects until 1931. This meant that her neighbours had had an additional two years to recover, leaving France behind to suffer. France at this point had little by way of industrial output, and mainly relied upon trade. According to the contemporary economist Leonard Rist: by 1935, "France had to be content with a vegetative economy stabilised at the depressed level to which the previous two years had reduced her after the great disappointment of 1933".

  In the years 1936-38, France had only a 6 percent share in the world exports of manufactured products, as opposed to 1926-29 when they had closer to 11 percent (Mommsen, 1938 pp. 213). During these years, France took a sharp turn in electoral politics. Previously, France had consistently voted for moderately right wing parties and policies, but by 1936 the moderately Socialist Popular Front lead by Leon Blum had won the election. In the same manner as the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, the Popular Front was divided between focusing on public welfare and infrastructure, and arming itself against the impending German threat. This indecisiveness may have been as much of a problem from French militarisation as the poor economy itself.

  It must be acknowledged that Germany too had suffered severe effects of the great depression, due to the abrupt end to American loans. Germany's level of unemployment had increased from a mere 2 million in 1929 to over 6 million by March 1932 (Thomson, 1965, pp.131). Nevertheless, whilst France and others were lagging behind economically, Germany had already began preparing for war and had ended unemployment through the rebuilding of the military and the introduction of public works, thereby boosting aggregate demand considerably. In addition, in May 1933, Hitler had suspended all external debt payments and announced it to all of German's foreign creditors, thereby putting Germany into considerably less debt for a period of time.

Chamberlain in 1938, proudly displaying his peace
agreement with Hitler.

  Turning our attention yet again to Britain, there were additional factors at play which determined Britain's compliance with Germany. Firstly, Britain was militarily vulnerable. Britain still had imperial influence across the world at this point, but after the First World War her place in the world was no longer one of the greatest superpower. Her resources were spread thinly, and the commonwealth was unlikely to assist Britain in an armed conflict. Dominions such as Australia and Canada had little interest in the affairs of Central Europe, and Chamberlain was under pressure to convince them how much of a threat Hitler could be to their own interests. Other than New Zealand, most of the commonwealth was in favour of appeasing Hitler, and did not recognise the threat that he posed. Far away from central Europe, Britain's dominions failed to appreciate the concern she had towards the dictators. Rather than being bound to follow British policy decisions, the dominions were merely informed by them. (Ovendale, 1975 pp. 319). For instance South Africa, under Smuts was under the impression that supporting an armed campaign against Germany would result in their immediate involvement in the war, a path Smuts was reluctant to travel.

  This meant that other than the United States, Britain had nobody left to depend on for aid. Chamberlain was now largely reliant upon support from Roosevelt, who had promised that the US industry would be at Britain's disposal. Roosevelt recognised Hitler as a threat more than the commonwealth had, however military support was not a guarantee. It would seem that Anthony Eden (foreign secretary at the time) was expecting too much from Roosevelt too early on, and any armed conflict with Germany would be a disaster until there could be some way to gather allies and military might.

  Another reason for Britain's compliance with Germany was public opinion. Perhaps the smallest of the four factors listed, but a large one nevertheless. Ever since the end of the First World War and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, there had been sympathy for the German people and a sense of guilt at her harsh treatment by the allies. Both Britain and the US had recognised the dangers of punishing Germany to such a degree, and had urged for restraint. Although Germany did indeed lose her colonies, the Allies under Wilsons leadership had renounced "annexations" as well as "indemnities" that were usually required from defeated countries, instead these were replaced by "reparations" for the dead civilians in the victorious countries (Howard, 2002, pp.115). Wilson and Lloyd George had both been aiming for peace in Europe through the creation of a League of Nations, whereas Clemenceau's goal was to ensure Germany could never pose a threat to France again, at any cost.

A cartoon depicts the harsh terms imposed on Germany via the
Treaty of Versailles at the hands of French leader Clemenceau.

 In addition, Britain along with the US, had been strongly opposed to the idea of a permanent occupation of the Rhineland as well as the creation of independent buffer states between France and Germany, an idea concocted by Clemenceau to shield France from possible future German invasion (Stevenson, 2004, pp.522).

  Not only was there sympathy towards the Germans regarding the repercussions of the First World War, but there was also an element of understanding towards Hitler's aim to bring German speaking people under his rule. One of the main principles of the League of Nations that had been inspired by Wilson's Fourteen Points, was self determination for all national and ethnic groups. Incidentally, the Sudetenland was home to 3 million German speaking Czechs who wanted self determination, rather than being ruled over by the Czech government.  As Timothy Snyder has recently put it: "The Treaty of Versailles indeed contradicted the very principle for which the Entente Powers had claimed to fight the (first world) war: national self-determination." (Snyder, 2010, pp.8). With this principle in mind, it seemed only fair that the German people in the area should be granted such a right. German-backed Sudetenland Nazi party leader Henlein demanded national determination for the German speaking Czechs. Hitler supported these demands, promising to provide military assistance should they fail to be met. In 1938, without consulting the Czechs, the French, or even his own cabinet, Chamberlain visited Berchtesgaden and conceded self determination for the Sudeten Germans, declaring that "you can get all essentials without war and without delay." (Irving, pp.151). Chamberlain wasn't alone in thinking that Hitler would keep his word, and that this was purely a matter of self determination, and not a means for Hitler to gain control of a strategically useful area for both military or industrial purposes. They were gravely mistaken (Seton-Watson, 1939, pp.111).   Although this sympathy was short lived after Hitler's true intentions in Czecheslovakia were revealed, it must be argued that there was a strong sympathy for the German people in Britain and the United states, and a dedication to guarantee them the same rights as any other nation. Ultimately in Britain, there were differing sides of the argument regarding Germany's future, a struggle between "those who saw in Hitler's Third Reich a challenge and a menace to Western civilisation and those who still experienced a sense of guilt at the inequalities created by the Treaty of Versailles... the chasm which divided them was clearly unbridgeable, and it was in recognition of this lack of public unity that the Government formed their policy." (1966, Wheeler-Bennett, pp.238). Due to this undecided attitide towards Hitler, various half hearted policies were enacted, almost tip-toeing around the prospect of war, aiming to get Hitler to sign more agreements in the hope that it would be difficult for him to break them the more he had to sign. This proved futile as Hitler already had a long history of breaking his agreements, the Locarno Treaty being a perfect example.

  In conclusion, despite the reasons mentioned at the beginning, the largest factors that determined the French and British decision to appease Hitler with the Munich agreement were economic, social, and strategic. Both players were at a disadvantage by the mid to late 30's both militarily and economically (France in particular), and knew that the opportunity for war had either come and gone, or was yet to arise. Whatever public opinions had been at one point, it became clear that Hitler was indeed a threat to European security, therefore the appeasements did not come out of any affection towards Hitler or the Nazis, rather it was out of sheer precaution.

References:

(1973) W. Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression, Arnold, London, pp.70.

(1967) M. Golbert, The Appeasers, 2nd ed, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, pp.189.

(2007) M. Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.115.
(2003) D. Irving, Churchill's War: The Struggle for Power, Focal Point Publications, pp.151.

(1983) W.J Mommsen, The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, George Allen & Unwin, London, pp.213.

(1975) R. Ovendale, Appeasement and the English Speaking World, CS Printing, Wales, pp.320.

(2010) T. Snyder, Bloodlands; Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Vintage, pp.8.

(2004) D. Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of The First World War, Penguin, London, pp.522.

(1965) D. Thomson, England in the Twentieth Century: The Pelican History of Endland 9, Penguin Books, Middlesex, pp.130-131. 

(2001) J.M Roberts, Europe: 1880-1945, 3rd ed, Pearson Education ltd, pp.282-283.

(2001) E.M Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans: 1933-1939, pp.79.

(1939) R.W Seton Watson, Munich and the Dictators, Methuen and co ltd, London, pp.111.

(1966) J.W Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, Prologue to Tragedy, pp.238.

Owenism and the Cooperative movement.

How did Robert Owen's ideas affect the lives of men and women involved in the labour movements of the 19th century?

Robert Owen (1771-1858)

  The political movement known as "Owenism" named after the 19th century reformer Robert Owen, was the result of one man's vision to create a spiritual, social and political revolution among the disenfranchised. Broadly speaking, it was an attempt to create a better world based on the maximum use of reason and co-operation, an abandonment of "individual ignorant selfishness", and embracing "the origin of truth and good". If his aims could truly have been realised, it was Robert Owen's belief that humanity would enter a new age succeeding the unstable and ruthless period of industrial capitalism, where there would be a union "man to man" and lasting harmony "to nature and to God." (1858, Owen. R, pp.III).

  To many these aims may sound unrealistic, archaic, or vaguely defined. Therefore, it must be investigated as to how Owen aimed to achieve this utopian dream of his, and ultimately what the results were.  Was it doomed as a failure?, or were there successes and improvements for the lives of those men, women, and children involved with this historic movement? 
  Owenism itself is a difficult term to narrow down due to the broad array of reformers who were inspired by Owen's ideas of cooperation and self help. "Owenism" itself included thinkers who were anti-chartist, anti-insurrectionary, and on many occasions there were those who were sympathetic to Liberalism and Tory radicalism, with Richard Oastler's paternalism bearing a striking resemblance to Owen's.  Alternatively many of those who embraced Owen's ideas were sympathetic with the more revolutionary forms of syndicalism (2011, E. Hobsbawm, pp.152). 

  E.P Thompson suggests that Robert Owen theoretically was in line with thinkers such as William Godwin, and rather than being the "first of the modern Socialist theorists" he was "one of the last of the eighteenth century rationalists", (1991, pp.863). However, from a philosophical and theoretical point of view "Owenism" is largely considered a form of socialism. Indeed, in the manner of his contemporary radical thinkers he believed that the "natural standard of human labour" should be recognised as the "practical standard of value". This would later inspire the rule: "Cost the Limit of Price" given by Josiah Warren (father of individualist-anarchism and part time associate of Owen).  However, since the time of Thomas Hodgskin's publication of the pamphlet Labour Defended, there had already been a far more systematic criticism of the current economic system, with the declaration that capital, contributing little to nothing on its own to the creation of value, reaped a disproportionate amount of the reward that labour (being the true source of value) was entitled to.
  Nevertheless, Karl Marx and Frederich Engels in certain instances spoke highly of him. In somewhat praising terms, "English Socialism" according to Engels, "arose with Owen," 

 "a manufacturer, and proceeds therefore with great consideration toward the bourgeoisie and great injustice toward the proletariat in its methods, although it culminates in demanding the abolition of the class antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat." (1845, Engels. F, pp.236).

   Another view that is usually considered vital in order to be considered a socialist, is the belief in human equality. For Robert Owen however there had always been a strong sense of paternalism. In Owen's eyes the poor did not simply need to be alleviated from material want, but their intellectual and spiritual outlook also needed to be changed. Without a completely new social order based upon his principles, without proper education and enlightenment, as a class they could never rise above their current lowly way of life. However, despite his views concerning the current moral condition of the poor, it must be noted that he believed human beings were influenced by their environments and were all equally malleable, and therefore everybody had the same potential to be improved as a human being under the correct circumstances.  However, Marx noted in his thesis on Fuerbach that: 

"the materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one which is superior to society." (1968, Marx. K, pp.660).

  Owen was also attacked by the more contemporary radical reformers for his proposals, and his model co-operative villages were scornfully referred to by William Cobbett as "Mr Owen's Parallelograms of Paupers". The idea of setting up villages for the poor and indoctrinating them into new ways of thinking resembled Malthusianism, and it was feared that under the authority of the already hated British government these villages would quickly show themselves to be no different from the dreaded workhouses. William Sherwin for example, feared that these proposed institutions would be "prisons", "a community of vassals":

 "Mr Owen's object appears to me to be to cover the face of the country with workhouses, to rear up a community of slaves, and consequently to render the labouring part of the people absolutely dependant upon men of property." (1817, Sherwin. W)

 This was of course hyperbole, and Robert Owen firmly denied these claims. In light of this bitter hostility from the democratic reformers and their fear of it escalating into tyranny, it must now be shown if in reality Owen's proposals when taken into action did successfully affect peoples lives in a positive way, or confirmed their criticisms.

  The first of Owen's projects was a textile factory in New Lanark in Scotland. It was here that Owen introduced many improvements to working conditions compared with other factories. Hours were shorter, working conditions were safer, there were schools for all ages, moral education, renovated housing, an end to child labour and insurance plans funded through payroll deduction. Under the influence of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, it was commonly assumed that such measures to insure the well being of the workers would necessarily lead to a decrease in profits, however the factory itself managed to yield considerable profits. It must be noted that Owen was himself morally opposed to the reckless hedonism of the profit motive, but nevertheless intended to generate profits for the factory, which could then be spent on improving conditions within the factory even further. In this sense Robert Owen was trying to create a self sufficient community. Eventually, New Lanark became a common place for tourists to visit our of sheer curiosity regarding this strange new venture (2009, Kreis. S).
  The project would not last long however and took up much of Owen's fortunes, this was because it received too little support from public finance and even less from the private sector. The lack of support and often outright suspicion from the rest of the labour movement made it difficult for it to grow in size. However, this one failed venture must not be seen as a representation of the entire history of Owenism and its war against depravity.

  After the failure of New Lanark, Owen set sail for America in order to repeat similar experiments there. It was here where Robert Owen would be joined by Josiah Warren in the new cooperative village known as New Harmony. Unfortunately, the interests of the nine hundred people who had joined were too disconnected, and many members desired to keep their rewards to themselves individually, a warning Warren had already given. Warren eventually left in 1827 because in in New Harmony he believed that:

Josiah Warren (1798-1874)

"interests were directly at war with the individualities of persons and circumstances and the instinct of self-preservation... and it was evident that just in proportion to the contact of persons or interests, so are concessions and compromises indispensable."



  As this unfolded however, Owen's ideas had begun to take hold among the working class movement in England. Between 1820 and 1840, Owenite ideas were being adopted and fused with the anti-capitalist notions of the "Ricardian Socialists" (including Hodgskin), those who had already taken to their revolutionary conclusions, the implications of David Ricardo's economic theories on rent, wages, and the labour theory of value presented in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). It was much to Owen's shock to find that on his return from America his theories were being refined by the likes of Thompson, Grey, and others and were being widely discussed and held in much wider respect than before he had departed. Not merely in theoretical circles and debates over reform were Owen's ideas being taken on board, but many trade unions were now using Owenite schemes and going by cooperative principles of self help and mutual aid. Examples of this would be Dr King in Brighton writing the Cooperator  and conducting multiple experiments in cooperative trading all based upon the New Lanark model of in store credit. Owen had found himself at the head of a movement which led on to the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union. 
   It was because of the increasingly radical aims of movements such as the Grand Union that the liberals eventually began to withdraw their support for the Owenites and quell the more radical tendencies of the left. Eventually the British armed forces, which had been deployed against the Chartists in the past, were now holding the Owenites in check. This happened despite the commander of the armed forces sympathising with their more middle class reformist aims (2011, Hobsbawm. E, pp.149). 
   The arrest of the 6 'Tolpuddle Martyrs' for attempting to create an agricultural workers union was yet another example of an attempt to stifle the potential success of such cooperative movements. This merely solidified the discontent the labouring poor had already had with the liberals and the moderates since the reform act of 1832. According to Eric Hobsbawm, in the 1830's there had been a growing working class movement which considered the Whigs to be traitors. This movement itself was Owenite influenced and support for them grew astronomically between the years 1839-1842 and remained significantly high for many years. The movement however was reduced to little more than an educational and propagandist movement with a co-operative store in Rochdale, due to a lack of effective planning on the part of their leaders. Therefore it was easy for the government and employers to wage offensives against them and gain the upper hand. It is because of this that Owenite socialism would largely fall out of the mainstream of labour agitation, and would be surpassed by the Chartists as the main front for social justice (2011. Hobsbawm. E, 149-152).
  According to George Lichtheim, after having been thrust to the forefront of the cooperative movement after his return from America and being looked towards by a number of labour leaders for guidance, Owen's response was yet another Utopian colonisation scheme which itself failed. Owen would shortly depart from politics, leaving the labour movement to its fate with Chartism, which too eventually failed in turn. A man considered by Engels to be the father of the movement and who had been looked upon by much of the labour movement had had his vibrant political career "succeeded by... sad last years" (1970, pp.42).

Instead of looking for the short term successes of Robert Owen, perhaps it is better to examine what he left behind. 

 In an essay by Sidney Pollard it is pointed out that since the time of Owen, the cooperative movement had been concerned with more than material well being, food, clothes etc. and focused on moral education and teaching people to look after their fellow man. It always taught that cooperation was preferable to standing alone because by himself, "the working man was always helpless against the powers which assailed him; united with others he could "acquire education, accumulate capital, organise large businesses, and ultimately, perhaps, employ himself." (Pollard. S, 1967, pp.111).

 In conclusion, Owenism then is ultimately a term hard to define due to the various differing reformers who themselves adopted Owenism into their own thinking. Nevertheless, the basic principles of co-operation, the maximisation of human potential, self help and surpassing a system of reckless hedonism etc. are all attributable to Owen's thoughts and resonated long throughout the cooperative movement. In terms of his success, it appears that the fatherly figure found himself wasting large amounts of money on schemes to alleviate the poor that largely failed. However, in addition to the few thousand lives he improved on a short term basis, his greatest success was his legacy; the future of the cooperative movement which for years despite many hardships endured and provided pockets of harmony for those fortunate enough to be involved with them. 

 References:
(2009) Engels. F, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, Cosimo Inc, New York, pp.236
(2011) Hobsawm. E, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848, Abacus, London, pp.65, 149-152.
(2009) Kreis. S, Lecture 22, The Utopian Socialists: Robert Owen and Saint-Simon (2), [online], Available at <http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture22a.html>[Accessed 23 March 2012]
(1964) Hodgskin, T. Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, Hammersmith.
(1970) Lichtheim. G, A Short History of Socialism, Praeger Publishers Inc, London, pp.42.
(1968) Marx. K, The German Ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp.660.
(1858) Owen. R, The Life of Robert Owen, Vol 1:A, Effingham Wilson, London, pp.III.
(1971) Ricardo. D, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 2nd edition, Pelican Classics, Middlesex.
(1817) Sherwin. W, Political Register, 26 April, 9 August, 20 September.
(1991) Thompson. E.P, The Making of the English Working Class, 2nd Ed, Penguin Books, London, pp.861,863.

Findings at the Imperial War Museum

I visited the Imperial War Museum in London last Wednesday. Here are just a few of the things I saw.

Front Entrance

Near the front entrance there is a piece of the old Berlin Wall. This particular piece of graffiti was done by Jurgen Grosse aka "Indiano" in 1989.

This is an Argentine 20mm Anti-Aircraft twin gun. It has a 2178 tactical range and a 0.79" calibre, and requires three gunners. It was captured in by the British in 1982 during the Falklands war.

In 1941, Rudolf Hess took off in a Messerschmitt BF 110D to Scotland in order to negotiate peace with the British. This is the wreckage of the plane after it was shot down. (For more on Hess' experiences after his capture, I recommend "Hess, the Missing Years" by David Irving and "Hess, the British Conspiracy" by John Harris and M.J Trow.)

Rear fuselage.

Daimer Benz DB6O1A engine.

Reductionism, a correction.

 I previously made (and deleted) an entry titled "Struggling with IR Theory". My contention was that IR theory attempts to explain phenomena at such a wide scope that it misses important intricacies that can only be observed by "zooming in" so to speak. In other words, it takes a uselessly holistic approach to the international actors (states, corporations etc) when it needs to analyse the individuals that they are comprised of.
 I was guilty of a reductionism which was largely the result of my views on economics, or to be precise my views on the relation between macro and micro-economics.
Much of this is touched on by Prof Steve Keen, author of the recent "Debunking Economics".
 I recommend this video introduction to anyone interested in seeing the other side to the neo-classical consensus.