Why Appease Hitler?

Why did Britain and France try to appease Hitler prior to WWII?

 In 1938, Britain and France signed the Munich Agreement with Germany, which allowed for the annexation of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. This was an historical act of appeasement and there were various reasons why both Britain and France allowed for it. For instance, many Britons saw Hitler as a possible ally against Russian communism, and the British Labour party also wanted to spend more money on infrastructure rather than on the military. In France, there was also the psychological fear of another war in Europe. France's landscape had been severely scarred by the First World War, and it was no surprise that there was a fear of repeating such an event.

  Though these are legitimate reasons for France and Britain appeasing Hitler, they are not the most significant ones.

  The largest factors that lead to the signing of the Munich agreement were: Hitler's remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the state of the European economy, Britain's lack of reliable allies, and the growing sympathy towards Germany in the British public.

The French Maginot Line

  In 1936 Hitler took a great risk and moved his troops to the Rhineland. This helped to secure an area of great strategic importance to him. The Rhineland was the easiest route between France and Germany, this was precisely why Germany had been forbidden to place troops there as per the Locarno Treaty. Because of this, Germany had not placed troops in the area since World War One. According to the treatise, an act of this nature would be "regarded as a hostile act... and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world". Such a risky move held grave implications for Germany, as it could have been met with completely justified aggression from neighbouring European countries. However, due to various psychological and economic factors, France did nothing. Hitler had gambled, and it had paid off. Had Europe responded to this act "Germany's chances in the event of a full scale attack were hopeless" (Robertson, 2001, pp. 79).

  Hitler was well aware of the strategic importance of the Rhineland, and it was made clear by the German foreign office that "until the Rhineland had been digested no active steps would be taken in foreign affairs... Once the western frontier had been fortified and the countries of Central Europe understood that France could not invade Germany at will, things would change." (Carr, 1972, pp. 70). France had recognised this threat from Germany since the early 30's, this prompted them to work on constructing the great 'Manginot line'. However this was not enough, and the "comforting shelter of her fortresses" has distracted the French from the very real need for an active standing army. (Roberts, 2001, pp.283)

Now that there was no easy means of entering Germany and preventing misdemeanors, the French government finally realised that their greatest leverage had been lost. Any future diplomacy with Germany would have to take this into account.

  The next large factor was the state of the European economy. Most countries throughout Europe and the world were still feeling the effects of the great depression which occurred in 1929 and had lasted throughout the 30's. Britain was suffering due to her reliance on international trade, which was still recovering from the war time disorganisation. By September 1932, unemployment in Britain had risen to a staggering 3.75 million (Thomson, 1965, pp.130-131).

  France was an anomaly in this respect, while Britain and the United States had experienced the economic depression at that time, France would not feel the effects until 1931. This meant that her neighbours had had an additional two years to recover, leaving France behind to suffer. France at this point had little by way of industrial output, and mainly relied upon trade. According to the contemporary economist Leonard Rist: by 1935, "France had to be content with a vegetative economy stabilised at the depressed level to which the previous two years had reduced her after the great disappointment of 1933".

  In the years 1936-38, France had only a 6 percent share in the world exports of manufactured products, as opposed to 1926-29 when they had closer to 11 percent (Mommsen, 1938 pp. 213). During these years, France took a sharp turn in electoral politics. Previously, France had consistently voted for moderately right wing parties and policies, but by 1936 the moderately Socialist Popular Front lead by Leon Blum had won the election. In the same manner as the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, the Popular Front was divided between focusing on public welfare and infrastructure, and arming itself against the impending German threat. This indecisiveness may have been as much of a problem from French militarisation as the poor economy itself.

  It must be acknowledged that Germany too had suffered severe effects of the great depression, due to the abrupt end to American loans. Germany's level of unemployment had increased from a mere 2 million in 1929 to over 6 million by March 1932 (Thomson, 1965, pp.131). Nevertheless, whilst France and others were lagging behind economically, Germany had already began preparing for war and had ended unemployment through the rebuilding of the military and the introduction of public works, thereby boosting aggregate demand considerably. In addition, in May 1933, Hitler had suspended all external debt payments and announced it to all of German's foreign creditors, thereby putting Germany into considerably less debt for a period of time.

Chamberlain in 1938, proudly displaying his peace
agreement with Hitler.

  Turning our attention yet again to Britain, there were additional factors at play which determined Britain's compliance with Germany. Firstly, Britain was militarily vulnerable. Britain still had imperial influence across the world at this point, but after the First World War her place in the world was no longer one of the greatest superpower. Her resources were spread thinly, and the commonwealth was unlikely to assist Britain in an armed conflict. Dominions such as Australia and Canada had little interest in the affairs of Central Europe, and Chamberlain was under pressure to convince them how much of a threat Hitler could be to their own interests. Other than New Zealand, most of the commonwealth was in favour of appeasing Hitler, and did not recognise the threat that he posed. Far away from central Europe, Britain's dominions failed to appreciate the concern she had towards the dictators. Rather than being bound to follow British policy decisions, the dominions were merely informed by them. (Ovendale, 1975 pp. 319). For instance South Africa, under Smuts was under the impression that supporting an armed campaign against Germany would result in their immediate involvement in the war, a path Smuts was reluctant to travel.

  This meant that other than the United States, Britain had nobody left to depend on for aid. Chamberlain was now largely reliant upon support from Roosevelt, who had promised that the US industry would be at Britain's disposal. Roosevelt recognised Hitler as a threat more than the commonwealth had, however military support was not a guarantee. It would seem that Anthony Eden (foreign secretary at the time) was expecting too much from Roosevelt too early on, and any armed conflict with Germany would be a disaster until there could be some way to gather allies and military might.

  Another reason for Britain's compliance with Germany was public opinion. Perhaps the smallest of the four factors listed, but a large one nevertheless. Ever since the end of the First World War and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, there had been sympathy for the German people and a sense of guilt at her harsh treatment by the allies. Both Britain and the US had recognised the dangers of punishing Germany to such a degree, and had urged for restraint. Although Germany did indeed lose her colonies, the Allies under Wilsons leadership had renounced "annexations" as well as "indemnities" that were usually required from defeated countries, instead these were replaced by "reparations" for the dead civilians in the victorious countries (Howard, 2002, pp.115). Wilson and Lloyd George had both been aiming for peace in Europe through the creation of a League of Nations, whereas Clemenceau's goal was to ensure Germany could never pose a threat to France again, at any cost.

A cartoon depicts the harsh terms imposed on Germany via the
Treaty of Versailles at the hands of French leader Clemenceau.

 In addition, Britain along with the US, had been strongly opposed to the idea of a permanent occupation of the Rhineland as well as the creation of independent buffer states between France and Germany, an idea concocted by Clemenceau to shield France from possible future German invasion (Stevenson, 2004, pp.522).

  Not only was there sympathy towards the Germans regarding the repercussions of the First World War, but there was also an element of understanding towards Hitler's aim to bring German speaking people under his rule. One of the main principles of the League of Nations that had been inspired by Wilson's Fourteen Points, was self determination for all national and ethnic groups. Incidentally, the Sudetenland was home to 3 million German speaking Czechs who wanted self determination, rather than being ruled over by the Czech government.  As Timothy Snyder has recently put it: "The Treaty of Versailles indeed contradicted the very principle for which the Entente Powers had claimed to fight the (first world) war: national self-determination." (Snyder, 2010, pp.8). With this principle in mind, it seemed only fair that the German people in the area should be granted such a right. German-backed Sudetenland Nazi party leader Henlein demanded national determination for the German speaking Czechs. Hitler supported these demands, promising to provide military assistance should they fail to be met. In 1938, without consulting the Czechs, the French, or even his own cabinet, Chamberlain visited Berchtesgaden and conceded self determination for the Sudeten Germans, declaring that "you can get all essentials without war and without delay." (Irving, pp.151). Chamberlain wasn't alone in thinking that Hitler would keep his word, and that this was purely a matter of self determination, and not a means for Hitler to gain control of a strategically useful area for both military or industrial purposes. They were gravely mistaken (Seton-Watson, 1939, pp.111).   Although this sympathy was short lived after Hitler's true intentions in Czecheslovakia were revealed, it must be argued that there was a strong sympathy for the German people in Britain and the United states, and a dedication to guarantee them the same rights as any other nation. Ultimately in Britain, there were differing sides of the argument regarding Germany's future, a struggle between "those who saw in Hitler's Third Reich a challenge and a menace to Western civilisation and those who still experienced a sense of guilt at the inequalities created by the Treaty of Versailles... the chasm which divided them was clearly unbridgeable, and it was in recognition of this lack of public unity that the Government formed their policy." (1966, Wheeler-Bennett, pp.238). Due to this undecided attitide towards Hitler, various half hearted policies were enacted, almost tip-toeing around the prospect of war, aiming to get Hitler to sign more agreements in the hope that it would be difficult for him to break them the more he had to sign. This proved futile as Hitler already had a long history of breaking his agreements, the Locarno Treaty being a perfect example.

  In conclusion, despite the reasons mentioned at the beginning, the largest factors that determined the French and British decision to appease Hitler with the Munich agreement were economic, social, and strategic. Both players were at a disadvantage by the mid to late 30's both militarily and economically (France in particular), and knew that the opportunity for war had either come and gone, or was yet to arise. Whatever public opinions had been at one point, it became clear that Hitler was indeed a threat to European security, therefore the appeasements did not come out of any affection towards Hitler or the Nazis, rather it was out of sheer precaution.

References:

(1973) W. Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression, Arnold, London, pp.70.

(1967) M. Golbert, The Appeasers, 2nd ed, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, pp.189.

(2007) M. Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.115.
(2003) D. Irving, Churchill's War: The Struggle for Power, Focal Point Publications, pp.151.

(1983) W.J Mommsen, The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, George Allen & Unwin, London, pp.213.

(1975) R. Ovendale, Appeasement and the English Speaking World, CS Printing, Wales, pp.320.

(2010) T. Snyder, Bloodlands; Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Vintage, pp.8.

(2004) D. Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of The First World War, Penguin, London, pp.522.

(1965) D. Thomson, England in the Twentieth Century: The Pelican History of Endland 9, Penguin Books, Middlesex, pp.130-131. 

(2001) J.M Roberts, Europe: 1880-1945, 3rd ed, Pearson Education ltd, pp.282-283.

(2001) E.M Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans: 1933-1939, pp.79.

(1939) R.W Seton Watson, Munich and the Dictators, Methuen and co ltd, London, pp.111.

(1966) J.W Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, Prologue to Tragedy, pp.238.