The religious views of Adolf Hitler.

  Was Hitler a Catholic, an Atheist, or otherwise?

Mythical depiction of Hitler as a knight by
Hubert Lanzinger.

 In this post I am not going to discuss the official Nazi policy towards established religion, the collaboration with and attacks against the church, nor do I intend to cover the martyrdom of theologians such a Dietrich Bonhoeffer. This is all well documented and widely known about.* We must not fall into the trap of assuming we can infer Hitler's views on religion by simply observing the party actions. This omnipotent image of Hitler has long fallen out of fashion amongst historians.

Instead, the focus will be on Hitler's own personal spiritual beliefs, and the only way to do this is to examine his own words.

 It has become very popular for atheists to claim Hitler was religious, and for the religious to declare the opposite. A perfect example can be seen in this interview below, in which conservative pundit Bill O'Reilly says that it is "well documented" that Hitler was an atheist, to which Richard Dawkins responds by saying Hitler was a Catholic. 

 It is true that Hitler remained a member of the Catholic church up to his death, as did Goering and Goebbels at the Fuhrer's orders. Nevertheless, formal membership of a religious organization tells us nothing of an individual's personal beliefs, and as Hitler's minister for armaments and war production Albert Speer recalled, despite his continued membership of the Catholic church, Hitler "had no real attachment to it".

 Other atheists like to take certain quotes from Hitler which indicate that his actions were taken with religious motivation. A popular quote is: "I believe today that my conduct is in accordance with the will of the mighty creator."(1)

 The problem with quotes such as these is that they are all from Mein Kampf, which was a book written for the public in the 20s, a semi manifesto. Let us not forget that Adolf Hitler was a politician, and politicians above all have the incentive to mask their true opinions in order to appeal to the population. Therefore we must recognise that there were two Hitlers: the public man and the private man. As Speer also described: "Amid his political associates in Berlin, Hitler made harsh pronouncements against the church, but in the presence of women he adopted a milder tone - one of the instances where he adapted his remarks to the surroundings." According to Speer, Hitler hoped to one day unite the Catholic and Protestant churches, but did not have confidence Reich Bishop Muller's ability to carry out such a radical proposal. (2)

One of the last ditch efforts of objectors is often to say that party radicals such as Bormann and Goebbels may have been anti-church radicals, but that Hitler was personally more favourable to religion. This modern day reasoning bares striking resemblance to the same view of Hitler that was held throughout large parts of the Third Reich. "The Fuhrer does not want this!" and "...inside you are Bolsheviks and Jews! Otherwise you wouldn't be able to carry on behind the Fuhrer's back!" were common objections raised against party upstarts (3). There was no truth behind these rationalisations, which were ultimately the intended result of the 'Fuhrer Myth' that had been constructed by Nazi propaganda. In truth, despite there being no written order for it by the Fuhrer himself, Hitler was in full approval of the closing down of Catholic monasteries. "...one must rejoice that the closing of the monasteries enables us to restore to the life of society many men who are capable of rendering services to the community and wishful to work... monasteries are generally corporations, and consequently can be dissolved by means of private agreements made with the Prior." (4).

 Hitler nevertheless spoke of the inevitable clash between National Socialism and religion, but rather than advocating a war, instead proposed to let the different religions "devour themselves, without persecution."

"...we must not replace the church with something equivalent. That would be terrifying! It goes without saying that the whole thing needs a lot of thought. Everything will occur in due time. It is a simple question of honesty... The German people's especial quality is patience; and it's the only one of the peoples capable of undertaking a revolution in this sphere." (5)

 Hitler would often speak of Bolshevism and Christianity as greatly intertwined, referring to the former as the "illegitimate child" of the latter. (6) It was discussed on the Night of the 29th-30th of November 1944 the relationship between Christianity, Communism, and Jewry. 

 "Jesus was certainly not a Jew. The Jews would never have handed one of their own people to the Roman courts; they would have condemned Him themselves. It is quite probable that a large number of the descendants of the Roman legionaries, mostly Gauls, were living in Galilee, and Jesus was probably one of them. His mother may well have been a Jewess. Jesus fought against the materialism of His age, and, therefore, against the Jews. 

Paul of Tarsus, who was originally one of the most stubborn enemies of the Christians, suddenly realised the immense possibilities of using, intelligently and for other ends, an idea which was exercising such great powers of fascination. He realised that the judicious exploitation of this idea among non-Jews would give him far greater power in the world than would the promise of material profit to the Jews themselves. It was then that the future St. Paul distorted with diabolical cunning the Christian idea. Out of this idea, which was a declaration of the Jews, he created a rallying point for slaves of all kinds against those in dominant authority." The religion fabricated by Paul of Tarsus which was later called Christianity, is nothing but the Communism of to-day.

(Martin) Bormann intervened. Jewish methods, he said, have never varied in their essentials. Everywhere they have stirred up the plebs against the ruling classes. Everywhere they have fostered discontent against the established power. For these are the seeds which produce the crop they hope later to gather. Everywhere they fan the flames of hatred between peoples of the same blood. It is they who invented class-warfare, and the repudiation of this theory must therefore always be an anti-Jewish measure. In the same way, any doctrine which is anti-Communist, any doctrine which is anti-Christian must, ipso facto, be anti-Jewish as well. The National Socialist doctrine is therefore anti-Jewish in excelsis, for it is both anti-Communist and anti-Christian. National Socialism is solid to the core, and the whole of its strength is concentrated against the Jews, even in matters which appear to have a purely social aspect and are designed for the furtherance of the social amenities of our own people. The Fuehrer concluded:

Burgdorff has just given me a paper which deals with the relationship between Communism and Christianity. It is comforting to see how, even in these days, the fatal relationship between the two is daily becoming clearer to the human intelligence."(7)

 This extract gives us much to ponder. Firstly, the opening statement that Jesus was not a Jew, coupled with the speculation about the ethnicity of his mother tells us a great deal about Hitler's own opinion towards the status of those with one Jewish parent. However, on the subject of religion it reveals once again the hostile attitude towards Christianity, but shows explicitly that it was due to its Jewish corruption. Remarks like this bear a striking resemblance to those of Arthur Schopenhauer, who in his magnum opus spoke of the restriction upon Christianity by "an element quite foreign to it", which was the "Jewish doctrine of faith."

German philosophers, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer,
& Friederich Nietzsche

"The sublime founder of Christianity had necessarily to adapt and accomodate himself, partly consciously, partly, it may be, unconsciously, to this doctrine; and so Christianity is composed of two very heterogeneous elements." (8)

 It is more than possible that this speculation was inspired by Schopenhauer, as on the 16th of May 1944, Hitler spoke praisingly of German philosophers Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and referred to them as the "greatest of (German) thinkers, in comparison with whom the British, the French and the Americans have nothing to offer."

"His complete refutation of the teachings which were a heritage from the Middle Ages, and of the dogmatic philosophy of the Church, is the greatest of the services which Kant has rendered to us. It is on the foundation of Kant's theory of knowledge that Schopenhauer built the edifice of his own philosophy, and it is Schopenhauer who annihilated the pragmatism of Hegel. I carried Schopenhauer's works with me throughout the whole of the first World War." 

 Hegel would later on act as the basis for Karl Marx's own theory of Historical Materialism, and so it is no wonder that Hitler marvelled at Schopenhauer's refutation of him. However, Hitler also rejected Schopenhauer's pessimism, believing it to have "been far surpassed by Nietzsche." (9) Therefore it would be wrong to label Hitler as a Schopenhauerian, especially given Schopenhauer's views on nationalism and individualism.

"Individuality is a far more important thing than nationality... National character is only another name for the particular platform which the littleness, perversity and baseness of mankind take in every country. Every nation mocks at other nations, and they are all right." (10)

 It would also be wrong to label Hitler's views as anything more than "quasi-Nietzschean". As Michael Burleigh argued, the Nazis latched onto a distorted version of Nietzsche that originated with his sister Elizabeth and her "barmy husband, Bernhard Forster". 

 "Much of Nietzsche's thought has to be suppressed to construe him as a proto-Nazi, principally his view of antisemites as part of the nihilistic 'herd', or 'mob' whom he despised: 'worm-eaten physiological casualties [are] all men of Ressentiment, a whole vibrating realm of subterranean revenge, inexhaustible and insatiable in its eruptions against the happy, and likewise in masquerades of revenge and pretexts for revenge. Nietzsche welcomed the creative involvement of Jews in what he hoped would be 'the strongest possible European mixed race', a notion hard to square with Hitler's obsession with racial purity." (11)

 In this extract Hitler also refers to Jesus' fight against the "materialism of His age", which is a common theme throughout his conversations. In fact, Hitler feared that the increasingly apparent problems inherent in Christianity were "ripening mankind for conversion to materialistic Bolshevism" which would be a "terrible tragedy" because mankind would "lose all sense of proportion, and once he considers himself to be the lord of the universe, it will be the end of everything." (12) The absurdity of Christianity then, in Hitler's eyes would give birth to an age of atheism, which was hated at least equally! This echoes his previous denunciation of the Catholic Centre Party during the Weimar years for all too willingly engaging in coalitions with the 'atheist internationalists' of the Social Democrat Party. (13) This view was also carried into the policy of the SS, which forbade atheism as a declared option for its members, leaving only Protestant, Catholic, or 'believer in God' (which appears to mean a non religious theism). This was because atheism signified a denial of higher powers, which constituted a potential source for indiscipline (14).

 Hitler was not always hostile to the "materialistic" Bolsheviks however. On the night of July the 11th 1941, Hitler used the Russians an an example of a people who were unafraid of death despite their lack of belief in a God. This he believed, refuted the idea that religion was necessary because everyone needs "a refuge where he can find consolation and help in unhappiness." Hitler compared this phenomena to two children raised in different environments:

"When one provokes in a child a fear of the dark, one awakens in him a feeling of atavistic dread. Thus this child will be ruled all his life by this dread, whereas another child, who has been intelligently brought up, will be free of it."

 This ability to face death in the absence of a God, due to long being free from dogmatic religious teaching, was "a lesson" that could be "drawn from the Bolshevik front." (15). Hitler declared that "man has discovered in nature the wonderful notion of that all-mighty being whose law he worships." and described the "God" or "the almighty" as "the domination of natural laws throughout the whole universe." (which combined with his belief in divine providence, sounds remarkably like Stoic pantheism) (16).

 One of Christianity's weaknesses in Hitler's eyes, was the precision with which God is explained. This meant that if the Church were to advance with the times and keep up with science (which was never stationary), the ground would "inevitably be cut from under her feet." It was for this reason then, that the Church was opposed to all progress. Islam had an advantage over Christianity in this respect. This was because according to the Islamic faith, "to form a conception of Allah is not vouchsafed to man."(17). Thus Islam could continuously adapt itself to modern science by making the nature of God as mysterious and as nebulous as necessary, unlike the the Christian "conception of the Beyond" which exposed itself to "attacks of unceasing progress". This was not the only positive remark Hitler had towards the Islamic faith. Hitler could "imagine people being enthusiastic about the paradise of Mahomet", but not for the "insipid paradise of the Christians" where one would after having listened to Wagner while alive, hear "nothing but hallelujahs"(18). Furthermore, according to Albert Speer:"Hitler had been much impressed by a scrap of history he had learned from a delegation of distinguished Arabs." Had the Mohammedans won the battle of Tours in the eighth century, they would have moved beyond France and into Central Europe, and thus the world would have been Mohammedan. "For theirs was a religion that believed in spreading the faith by the sword and subjugating all nations to that faith." Due to their racial inferiority, Hitler speculated, the Arabs would have eventually abandonded the harsh European climate,  leaving "Islamized Germans" standing "at the head of this Mohammedan Empire." Hitler regretted that Europe inherited Christianity with its "meekness and flabbiness". "Why didn't we have the religion of the Japanese who regard sacrifice for the Fatherland as the highest good? The Mohammedan religion too would have been much more compatible to us than Christianity." (19). 
Instead, Europe was left with Christanity with its "degenerative effects" which were allegedly partly to blame for the decline of the Roman Empire (20). As an interesting sidenote, Heinrich Himmler made similar remarks to his Croatian volunteers in 1944, stating that he had "nothing against Islam; for it preaches to its members in this division and promises them paradise if they fought and died. A practical and agreeable religion for soldiers!"(21)

 If it is possible to conclude on such a complex subject, it would appear that Hitler was not an atheist, nor was he a Catholic. He shared the same sentiments of Anti-theism with many well known atheists however this hatred was directed almost entirely towards the Christian church which he referred to as "nothing more than a hereditary joint stock company for the exploitation of human stupidity." (22).  Due to the influence of the established Churches over the German population at the time, he had to be strategic and wait patiently for the eventual disappearance of religion from society.

 Though, not a follower of any particular religion, Hitler was by no means an atheist, and remained incredibly hostile towards materialism and Bolshevism, which he tied together with the biggest target of his hatred, the Jews.

* If you want to know more about this I highly recommend The Nazi Persecution of the Churches by J.S Conway. 

(1) Taken from Chapter 2 of Mein Kampf Volume I. Multiple other quotes of this nature can be found at Atheism.About.com.

(2) (1995) Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Phoenix, pp.148-149.
(3) (2001) Ian Kershaw, The Hitler Myth, Oxford University Press, pp.178-179.
(4) (1973) Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-44, Introduced by H.R. Trevor Roper, 7th April 1942.

(5) ibid, Night of the 11th-12th July 1941, pp.6-7.

(6) ibid.

(7) ibid, pp.721-22.

(8) (1819) Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume I, Dover Publications Inc, New York, 1969, pp.387-388.

(9) Table Talk, pp.720.

(10) (1851) Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena, The Wisdom of Life, Cosimo Inc, New York, 2007.

(11) (2001) Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich, A New History, Macmillan, London, pp.98. "worm-eaten physiological casualties..."is from Nietzsche's The Geneology of Morals.

(12) Table Talk, 1st Aug, 1942, pp.607.

(13) Burleigh, The Third Reich, pp.717.

(14) ibid, pp.196-197.

(15) Table Talk, pp.6.

(16) ibid.

(17) ibid, pp.606.

(18) ibid, 13th Dec, 1941, pp.143.

(19) Speer, Inside, pp.149-150.
(20) (2001) Jeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham, Nazism: 1919-1945, A Documentary Reader, Volume III, 3rd Ed, University of Exeter Press, pp.75 (Doc: 503. Hossbach report 5th Nov, 1937.)
(21) (2012) Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler: A Life, Oxford University Press, pp.677.

(22) Table Talk, pp.606.

Why Appease Hitler?

Why did Britain and France try to appease Hitler prior to WWII?

 In 1938, Britain and France signed the Munich Agreement with Germany, which allowed for the annexation of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. This was an historical act of appeasement and there were various reasons why both Britain and France allowed for it. For instance, many Britons saw Hitler as a possible ally against Russian communism, and the British Labour party also wanted to spend more money on infrastructure rather than on the military. In France, there was also the psychological fear of another war in Europe. France's landscape had been severely scarred by the First World War, and it was no surprise that there was a fear of repeating such an event.

  Though these are legitimate reasons for France and Britain appeasing Hitler, they are not the most significant ones.

  The largest factors that lead to the signing of the Munich agreement were: Hitler's remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the state of the European economy, Britain's lack of reliable allies, and the growing sympathy towards Germany in the British public.

The French Maginot Line

  In 1936 Hitler took a great risk and moved his troops to the Rhineland. This helped to secure an area of great strategic importance to him. The Rhineland was the easiest route between France and Germany, this was precisely why Germany had been forbidden to place troops there as per the Locarno Treaty. Because of this, Germany had not placed troops in the area since World War One. According to the treatise, an act of this nature would be "regarded as a hostile act... and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world". Such a risky move held grave implications for Germany, as it could have been met with completely justified aggression from neighbouring European countries. However, due to various psychological and economic factors, France did nothing. Hitler had gambled, and it had paid off. Had Europe responded to this act "Germany's chances in the event of a full scale attack were hopeless" (Robertson, 2001, pp. 79).

  Hitler was well aware of the strategic importance of the Rhineland, and it was made clear by the German foreign office that "until the Rhineland had been digested no active steps would be taken in foreign affairs... Once the western frontier had been fortified and the countries of Central Europe understood that France could not invade Germany at will, things would change." (Carr, 1972, pp. 70). France had recognised this threat from Germany since the early 30's, this prompted them to work on constructing the great 'Manginot line'. However this was not enough, and the "comforting shelter of her fortresses" has distracted the French from the very real need for an active standing army. (Roberts, 2001, pp.283)

Now that there was no easy means of entering Germany and preventing misdemeanors, the French government finally realised that their greatest leverage had been lost. Any future diplomacy with Germany would have to take this into account.

  The next large factor was the state of the European economy. Most countries throughout Europe and the world were still feeling the effects of the great depression which occurred in 1929 and had lasted throughout the 30's. Britain was suffering due to her reliance on international trade, which was still recovering from the war time disorganisation. By September 1932, unemployment in Britain had risen to a staggering 3.75 million (Thomson, 1965, pp.130-131).

  France was an anomaly in this respect, while Britain and the United States had experienced the economic depression at that time, France would not feel the effects until 1931. This meant that her neighbours had had an additional two years to recover, leaving France behind to suffer. France at this point had little by way of industrial output, and mainly relied upon trade. According to the contemporary economist Leonard Rist: by 1935, "France had to be content with a vegetative economy stabilised at the depressed level to which the previous two years had reduced her after the great disappointment of 1933".

  In the years 1936-38, France had only a 6 percent share in the world exports of manufactured products, as opposed to 1926-29 when they had closer to 11 percent (Mommsen, 1938 pp. 213). During these years, France took a sharp turn in electoral politics. Previously, France had consistently voted for moderately right wing parties and policies, but by 1936 the moderately Socialist Popular Front lead by Leon Blum had won the election. In the same manner as the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, the Popular Front was divided between focusing on public welfare and infrastructure, and arming itself against the impending German threat. This indecisiveness may have been as much of a problem from French militarisation as the poor economy itself.

  It must be acknowledged that Germany too had suffered severe effects of the great depression, due to the abrupt end to American loans. Germany's level of unemployment had increased from a mere 2 million in 1929 to over 6 million by March 1932 (Thomson, 1965, pp.131). Nevertheless, whilst France and others were lagging behind economically, Germany had already began preparing for war and had ended unemployment through the rebuilding of the military and the introduction of public works, thereby boosting aggregate demand considerably. In addition, in May 1933, Hitler had suspended all external debt payments and announced it to all of German's foreign creditors, thereby putting Germany into considerably less debt for a period of time.

Chamberlain in 1938, proudly displaying his peace
agreement with Hitler.

  Turning our attention yet again to Britain, there were additional factors at play which determined Britain's compliance with Germany. Firstly, Britain was militarily vulnerable. Britain still had imperial influence across the world at this point, but after the First World War her place in the world was no longer one of the greatest superpower. Her resources were spread thinly, and the commonwealth was unlikely to assist Britain in an armed conflict. Dominions such as Australia and Canada had little interest in the affairs of Central Europe, and Chamberlain was under pressure to convince them how much of a threat Hitler could be to their own interests. Other than New Zealand, most of the commonwealth was in favour of appeasing Hitler, and did not recognise the threat that he posed. Far away from central Europe, Britain's dominions failed to appreciate the concern she had towards the dictators. Rather than being bound to follow British policy decisions, the dominions were merely informed by them. (Ovendale, 1975 pp. 319). For instance South Africa, under Smuts was under the impression that supporting an armed campaign against Germany would result in their immediate involvement in the war, a path Smuts was reluctant to travel.

  This meant that other than the United States, Britain had nobody left to depend on for aid. Chamberlain was now largely reliant upon support from Roosevelt, who had promised that the US industry would be at Britain's disposal. Roosevelt recognised Hitler as a threat more than the commonwealth had, however military support was not a guarantee. It would seem that Anthony Eden (foreign secretary at the time) was expecting too much from Roosevelt too early on, and any armed conflict with Germany would be a disaster until there could be some way to gather allies and military might.

  Another reason for Britain's compliance with Germany was public opinion. Perhaps the smallest of the four factors listed, but a large one nevertheless. Ever since the end of the First World War and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, there had been sympathy for the German people and a sense of guilt at her harsh treatment by the allies. Both Britain and the US had recognised the dangers of punishing Germany to such a degree, and had urged for restraint. Although Germany did indeed lose her colonies, the Allies under Wilsons leadership had renounced "annexations" as well as "indemnities" that were usually required from defeated countries, instead these were replaced by "reparations" for the dead civilians in the victorious countries (Howard, 2002, pp.115). Wilson and Lloyd George had both been aiming for peace in Europe through the creation of a League of Nations, whereas Clemenceau's goal was to ensure Germany could never pose a threat to France again, at any cost.

A cartoon depicts the harsh terms imposed on Germany via the
Treaty of Versailles at the hands of French leader Clemenceau.

 In addition, Britain along with the US, had been strongly opposed to the idea of a permanent occupation of the Rhineland as well as the creation of independent buffer states between France and Germany, an idea concocted by Clemenceau to shield France from possible future German invasion (Stevenson, 2004, pp.522).

  Not only was there sympathy towards the Germans regarding the repercussions of the First World War, but there was also an element of understanding towards Hitler's aim to bring German speaking people under his rule. One of the main principles of the League of Nations that had been inspired by Wilson's Fourteen Points, was self determination for all national and ethnic groups. Incidentally, the Sudetenland was home to 3 million German speaking Czechs who wanted self determination, rather than being ruled over by the Czech government.  As Timothy Snyder has recently put it: "The Treaty of Versailles indeed contradicted the very principle for which the Entente Powers had claimed to fight the (first world) war: national self-determination." (Snyder, 2010, pp.8). With this principle in mind, it seemed only fair that the German people in the area should be granted such a right. German-backed Sudetenland Nazi party leader Henlein demanded national determination for the German speaking Czechs. Hitler supported these demands, promising to provide military assistance should they fail to be met. In 1938, without consulting the Czechs, the French, or even his own cabinet, Chamberlain visited Berchtesgaden and conceded self determination for the Sudeten Germans, declaring that "you can get all essentials without war and without delay." (Irving, pp.151). Chamberlain wasn't alone in thinking that Hitler would keep his word, and that this was purely a matter of self determination, and not a means for Hitler to gain control of a strategically useful area for both military or industrial purposes. They were gravely mistaken (Seton-Watson, 1939, pp.111).   Although this sympathy was short lived after Hitler's true intentions in Czecheslovakia were revealed, it must be argued that there was a strong sympathy for the German people in Britain and the United states, and a dedication to guarantee them the same rights as any other nation. Ultimately in Britain, there were differing sides of the argument regarding Germany's future, a struggle between "those who saw in Hitler's Third Reich a challenge and a menace to Western civilisation and those who still experienced a sense of guilt at the inequalities created by the Treaty of Versailles... the chasm which divided them was clearly unbridgeable, and it was in recognition of this lack of public unity that the Government formed their policy." (1966, Wheeler-Bennett, pp.238). Due to this undecided attitide towards Hitler, various half hearted policies were enacted, almost tip-toeing around the prospect of war, aiming to get Hitler to sign more agreements in the hope that it would be difficult for him to break them the more he had to sign. This proved futile as Hitler already had a long history of breaking his agreements, the Locarno Treaty being a perfect example.

  In conclusion, despite the reasons mentioned at the beginning, the largest factors that determined the French and British decision to appease Hitler with the Munich agreement were economic, social, and strategic. Both players were at a disadvantage by the mid to late 30's both militarily and economically (France in particular), and knew that the opportunity for war had either come and gone, or was yet to arise. Whatever public opinions had been at one point, it became clear that Hitler was indeed a threat to European security, therefore the appeasements did not come out of any affection towards Hitler or the Nazis, rather it was out of sheer precaution.

References:

(1973) W. Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression, Arnold, London, pp.70.

(1967) M. Golbert, The Appeasers, 2nd ed, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, pp.189.

(2007) M. Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.115.
(2003) D. Irving, Churchill's War: The Struggle for Power, Focal Point Publications, pp.151.

(1983) W.J Mommsen, The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, George Allen & Unwin, London, pp.213.

(1975) R. Ovendale, Appeasement and the English Speaking World, CS Printing, Wales, pp.320.

(2010) T. Snyder, Bloodlands; Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Vintage, pp.8.

(2004) D. Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of The First World War, Penguin, London, pp.522.

(1965) D. Thomson, England in the Twentieth Century: The Pelican History of Endland 9, Penguin Books, Middlesex, pp.130-131. 

(2001) J.M Roberts, Europe: 1880-1945, 3rd ed, Pearson Education ltd, pp.282-283.

(2001) E.M Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans: 1933-1939, pp.79.

(1939) R.W Seton Watson, Munich and the Dictators, Methuen and co ltd, London, pp.111.

(1966) J.W Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, Prologue to Tragedy, pp.238.

Owenism and the Cooperative movement.

How did Robert Owen's ideas affect the lives of men and women involved in the labour movements of the 19th century?

Robert Owen (1771-1858)

  The political movement known as "Owenism" named after the 19th century reformer Robert Owen, was the result of one man's vision to create a spiritual, social and political revolution among the disenfranchised. Broadly speaking, it was an attempt to create a better world based on the maximum use of reason and co-operation, an abandonment of "individual ignorant selfishness", and embracing "the origin of truth and good". If his aims could truly have been realised, it was Robert Owen's belief that humanity would enter a new age succeeding the unstable and ruthless period of industrial capitalism, where there would be a union "man to man" and lasting harmony "to nature and to God." (1858, Owen. R, pp.III).

  To many these aims may sound unrealistic, archaic, or vaguely defined. Therefore, it must be investigated as to how Owen aimed to achieve this utopian dream of his, and ultimately what the results were.  Was it doomed as a failure?, or were there successes and improvements for the lives of those men, women, and children involved with this historic movement? 
  Owenism itself is a difficult term to narrow down due to the broad array of reformers who were inspired by Owen's ideas of cooperation and self help. "Owenism" itself included thinkers who were anti-chartist, anti-insurrectionary, and on many occasions there were those who were sympathetic to Liberalism and Tory radicalism, with Richard Oastler's paternalism bearing a striking resemblance to Owen's.  Alternatively many of those who embraced Owen's ideas were sympathetic with the more revolutionary forms of syndicalism (2011, E. Hobsbawm, pp.152). 

  E.P Thompson suggests that Robert Owen theoretically was in line with thinkers such as William Godwin, and rather than being the "first of the modern Socialist theorists" he was "one of the last of the eighteenth century rationalists", (1991, pp.863). However, from a philosophical and theoretical point of view "Owenism" is largely considered a form of socialism. Indeed, in the manner of his contemporary radical thinkers he believed that the "natural standard of human labour" should be recognised as the "practical standard of value". This would later inspire the rule: "Cost the Limit of Price" given by Josiah Warren (father of individualist-anarchism and part time associate of Owen).  However, since the time of Thomas Hodgskin's publication of the pamphlet Labour Defended, there had already been a far more systematic criticism of the current economic system, with the declaration that capital, contributing little to nothing on its own to the creation of value, reaped a disproportionate amount of the reward that labour (being the true source of value) was entitled to.
  Nevertheless, Karl Marx and Frederich Engels in certain instances spoke highly of him. In somewhat praising terms, "English Socialism" according to Engels, "arose with Owen," 

 "a manufacturer, and proceeds therefore with great consideration toward the bourgeoisie and great injustice toward the proletariat in its methods, although it culminates in demanding the abolition of the class antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat." (1845, Engels. F, pp.236).

   Another view that is usually considered vital in order to be considered a socialist, is the belief in human equality. For Robert Owen however there had always been a strong sense of paternalism. In Owen's eyes the poor did not simply need to be alleviated from material want, but their intellectual and spiritual outlook also needed to be changed. Without a completely new social order based upon his principles, without proper education and enlightenment, as a class they could never rise above their current lowly way of life. However, despite his views concerning the current moral condition of the poor, it must be noted that he believed human beings were influenced by their environments and were all equally malleable, and therefore everybody had the same potential to be improved as a human being under the correct circumstances.  However, Marx noted in his thesis on Fuerbach that: 

"the materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one which is superior to society." (1968, Marx. K, pp.660).

  Owen was also attacked by the more contemporary radical reformers for his proposals, and his model co-operative villages were scornfully referred to by William Cobbett as "Mr Owen's Parallelograms of Paupers". The idea of setting up villages for the poor and indoctrinating them into new ways of thinking resembled Malthusianism, and it was feared that under the authority of the already hated British government these villages would quickly show themselves to be no different from the dreaded workhouses. William Sherwin for example, feared that these proposed institutions would be "prisons", "a community of vassals":

 "Mr Owen's object appears to me to be to cover the face of the country with workhouses, to rear up a community of slaves, and consequently to render the labouring part of the people absolutely dependant upon men of property." (1817, Sherwin. W)

 This was of course hyperbole, and Robert Owen firmly denied these claims. In light of this bitter hostility from the democratic reformers and their fear of it escalating into tyranny, it must now be shown if in reality Owen's proposals when taken into action did successfully affect peoples lives in a positive way, or confirmed their criticisms.

  The first of Owen's projects was a textile factory in New Lanark in Scotland. It was here that Owen introduced many improvements to working conditions compared with other factories. Hours were shorter, working conditions were safer, there were schools for all ages, moral education, renovated housing, an end to child labour and insurance plans funded through payroll deduction. Under the influence of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, it was commonly assumed that such measures to insure the well being of the workers would necessarily lead to a decrease in profits, however the factory itself managed to yield considerable profits. It must be noted that Owen was himself morally opposed to the reckless hedonism of the profit motive, but nevertheless intended to generate profits for the factory, which could then be spent on improving conditions within the factory even further. In this sense Robert Owen was trying to create a self sufficient community. Eventually, New Lanark became a common place for tourists to visit our of sheer curiosity regarding this strange new venture (2009, Kreis. S).
  The project would not last long however and took up much of Owen's fortunes, this was because it received too little support from public finance and even less from the private sector. The lack of support and often outright suspicion from the rest of the labour movement made it difficult for it to grow in size. However, this one failed venture must not be seen as a representation of the entire history of Owenism and its war against depravity.

  After the failure of New Lanark, Owen set sail for America in order to repeat similar experiments there. It was here where Robert Owen would be joined by Josiah Warren in the new cooperative village known as New Harmony. Unfortunately, the interests of the nine hundred people who had joined were too disconnected, and many members desired to keep their rewards to themselves individually, a warning Warren had already given. Warren eventually left in 1827 because in in New Harmony he believed that:

Josiah Warren (1798-1874)

"interests were directly at war with the individualities of persons and circumstances and the instinct of self-preservation... and it was evident that just in proportion to the contact of persons or interests, so are concessions and compromises indispensable."



  As this unfolded however, Owen's ideas had begun to take hold among the working class movement in England. Between 1820 and 1840, Owenite ideas were being adopted and fused with the anti-capitalist notions of the "Ricardian Socialists" (including Hodgskin), those who had already taken to their revolutionary conclusions, the implications of David Ricardo's economic theories on rent, wages, and the labour theory of value presented in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). It was much to Owen's shock to find that on his return from America his theories were being refined by the likes of Thompson, Grey, and others and were being widely discussed and held in much wider respect than before he had departed. Not merely in theoretical circles and debates over reform were Owen's ideas being taken on board, but many trade unions were now using Owenite schemes and going by cooperative principles of self help and mutual aid. Examples of this would be Dr King in Brighton writing the Cooperator  and conducting multiple experiments in cooperative trading all based upon the New Lanark model of in store credit. Owen had found himself at the head of a movement which led on to the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union. 
   It was because of the increasingly radical aims of movements such as the Grand Union that the liberals eventually began to withdraw their support for the Owenites and quell the more radical tendencies of the left. Eventually the British armed forces, which had been deployed against the Chartists in the past, were now holding the Owenites in check. This happened despite the commander of the armed forces sympathising with their more middle class reformist aims (2011, Hobsbawm. E, pp.149). 
   The arrest of the 6 'Tolpuddle Martyrs' for attempting to create an agricultural workers union was yet another example of an attempt to stifle the potential success of such cooperative movements. This merely solidified the discontent the labouring poor had already had with the liberals and the moderates since the reform act of 1832. According to Eric Hobsbawm, in the 1830's there had been a growing working class movement which considered the Whigs to be traitors. This movement itself was Owenite influenced and support for them grew astronomically between the years 1839-1842 and remained significantly high for many years. The movement however was reduced to little more than an educational and propagandist movement with a co-operative store in Rochdale, due to a lack of effective planning on the part of their leaders. Therefore it was easy for the government and employers to wage offensives against them and gain the upper hand. It is because of this that Owenite socialism would largely fall out of the mainstream of labour agitation, and would be surpassed by the Chartists as the main front for social justice (2011. Hobsbawm. E, 149-152).
  According to George Lichtheim, after having been thrust to the forefront of the cooperative movement after his return from America and being looked towards by a number of labour leaders for guidance, Owen's response was yet another Utopian colonisation scheme which itself failed. Owen would shortly depart from politics, leaving the labour movement to its fate with Chartism, which too eventually failed in turn. A man considered by Engels to be the father of the movement and who had been looked upon by much of the labour movement had had his vibrant political career "succeeded by... sad last years" (1970, pp.42).

Instead of looking for the short term successes of Robert Owen, perhaps it is better to examine what he left behind. 

 In an essay by Sidney Pollard it is pointed out that since the time of Owen, the cooperative movement had been concerned with more than material well being, food, clothes etc. and focused on moral education and teaching people to look after their fellow man. It always taught that cooperation was preferable to standing alone because by himself, "the working man was always helpless against the powers which assailed him; united with others he could "acquire education, accumulate capital, organise large businesses, and ultimately, perhaps, employ himself." (Pollard. S, 1967, pp.111).

 In conclusion, Owenism then is ultimately a term hard to define due to the various differing reformers who themselves adopted Owenism into their own thinking. Nevertheless, the basic principles of co-operation, the maximisation of human potential, self help and surpassing a system of reckless hedonism etc. are all attributable to Owen's thoughts and resonated long throughout the cooperative movement. In terms of his success, it appears that the fatherly figure found himself wasting large amounts of money on schemes to alleviate the poor that largely failed. However, in addition to the few thousand lives he improved on a short term basis, his greatest success was his legacy; the future of the cooperative movement which for years despite many hardships endured and provided pockets of harmony for those fortunate enough to be involved with them. 

 References:
(2009) Engels. F, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, Cosimo Inc, New York, pp.236
(2011) Hobsawm. E, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848, Abacus, London, pp.65, 149-152.
(2009) Kreis. S, Lecture 22, The Utopian Socialists: Robert Owen and Saint-Simon (2), [online], Available at <http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture22a.html>[Accessed 23 March 2012]
(1964) Hodgskin, T. Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, Hammersmith.
(1970) Lichtheim. G, A Short History of Socialism, Praeger Publishers Inc, London, pp.42.
(1968) Marx. K, The German Ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp.660.
(1858) Owen. R, The Life of Robert Owen, Vol 1:A, Effingham Wilson, London, pp.III.
(1971) Ricardo. D, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 2nd edition, Pelican Classics, Middlesex.
(1817) Sherwin. W, Political Register, 26 April, 9 August, 20 September.
(1991) Thompson. E.P, The Making of the English Working Class, 2nd Ed, Penguin Books, London, pp.861,863.

Findings at the Imperial War Museum

I visited the Imperial War Museum in London last Wednesday. Here are just a few of the things I saw.

Front Entrance

Near the front entrance there is a piece of the old Berlin Wall. This particular piece of graffiti was done by Jurgen Grosse aka "Indiano" in 1989.

This is an Argentine 20mm Anti-Aircraft twin gun. It has a 2178 tactical range and a 0.79" calibre, and requires three gunners. It was captured in by the British in 1982 during the Falklands war.

In 1941, Rudolf Hess took off in a Messerschmitt BF 110D to Scotland in order to negotiate peace with the British. This is the wreckage of the plane after it was shot down. (For more on Hess' experiences after his capture, I recommend "Hess, the Missing Years" by David Irving and "Hess, the British Conspiracy" by John Harris and M.J Trow.)

Rear fuselage.

Daimer Benz DB6O1A engine.

Reductionism, a correction.

 I previously made (and deleted) an entry titled "Struggling with IR Theory". My contention was that IR theory attempts to explain phenomena at such a wide scope that it misses important intricacies that can only be observed by "zooming in" so to speak. In other words, it takes a uselessly holistic approach to the international actors (states, corporations etc) when it needs to analyse the individuals that they are comprised of.
 I was guilty of a reductionism which was largely the result of my views on economics, or to be precise my views on the relation between macro and micro-economics.
Much of this is touched on by Prof Steve Keen, author of the recent "Debunking Economics".
 I recommend this video introduction to anyone interested in seeing the other side to the neo-classical consensus.

The Failure of the Luddites

 How the Luddites harmed the future of working class struggle in England.

A depiction of General Ned Ludd
 "The Leader of the Luddites".

Supposedly "laughed out of history" along with the Technocrats according to Henry Hazlitt, "Luddism" was a peculiar movement that emerged in the 19th century English Midlands. Skilled craftsmen who had thought themselves guaranteed a livelihood suddenly found themselves rendered obsolete by the introduction of labour saving technology, and suffered wage reductions and replacement by cheaper unskilled workers. In 1811, public petitioning was the first reaction but as the months went on, in the dead of night violence continually erupted throughout Nottinghamshare and other textile districts, and countless weaving frames were destroyed in protest.
 The Luddites successfully kept their identities unknown, writing their declarations under the alias "General Ned Ludd" and as a result managed to almost completely avoid arrest. The movement itself was very short lived however, and due to their small numbers (2000 according to Richard Jones) and their lack of unity or coordination, it was easy for the authorities to quell their behaviour. (2012, pp.79) The harshest of government measures against the Luddites was the Frame Breaking Act of February 1812 which made the destruction of weaving frames a capital offense.
In response to this act, Lord Byron himself gave a passionate defense of the Luddites in the House of Lords and opposed the bill:

Lord George Gordon Byron (1788-1824)

"...By the adoption of one species of frame in particular, one man performed the work of many, and the superfluous labourers were thrown out of employment. Yet it is to be observed, that the work thus executed was inferior in quality, not marketable at home, and merely hurried over with a view to exportation... 
 The rejected workmen, in the blindness of their ignorance... imagined that the maintenance and well doing of the industrious poor, were objects of greater consequence than the enrichment of a few individuals by any improvement in the implements of trade which threw the workmen out of employment, and rendered the labourer unworthy of his hire. And, it must be confessed, that although the adoption of the enlarged machinery, in that state of our commerce which the country once boasted, might have been beneficial to the master without being detrimental to the servant; yet, in the present situation of our manufactures, rotting in warehouses without a prospect of exportation, with the demand for work and workmen equally diminished, frames of this construction tend materially to aggravate the distresses and discontents of the disappointed sufferers..." (Available in full here)

 Despite sympathy from such an influential figure, the Luddites according to Richard Jones, received a "lack of sympathy among the wider public". This was because "New technology had already replaced many unskilled workers in the decades leading up to the Luddite uprisings" (2012, pp.79). Eric Hobsbawm on the other hand, argues that "a surprisingly large body of local businessmen and farmers sympathised profoundly with these Luddite activities of their labourers, because they too saw themselves as victims of a diabolical minority of selfish innovators."(2011, pp.55). 

 Nevertheless, regardless of how much public support the Luddites received, it was clearly not enough. After 1813, seventeen Luddites were hanged. The conservative nature of the movement, and the fact that it focused on the poverty of one small portion of the English working class and not on alleviating poverty in general, makes it hard to label Luddism a precursor to the rest of the working class movements. It is true that later movements such as Chartism contained within their ranks many former Luddites, but they were rarely open about their involvement and "had no more wish than a man with a criminal record to be reminded of their youth". This was due to the possible attention from the authorities. Arguably then, "Luddism ended on the scaffold" (1991, Thompson E.P, pp.541).

Not only did the Luddites fail to achieve their goals and go into hiding as a result, they arguably harmed working class movements to come. As Karl Marx noted "...the Luddite movement, gave the anti-Jacobin government, composed of such people as Sidmouth and Castereagh, a pretext for the most violent and reactionary measures." (1976, pp.554). Indeed, even the various friendly societies that existed throughout the late 18th to 19th centuries were treated with suspicion by the state and the influential classes. As early as 1871, the government called for investigations into the activities of the friendly societies. Although they were occasionally acknowledged as useful for alleviating poverty, they were oftentimes seen as a mask to cover up insurrectionary activities, and it was believed that without proper regulation they could be a menace to the existing order. A memorial sent to the Home Office from five engineering employers in London, complained of the conduct of their journeymen:

"(The Combination Laws) are artfully and efficaciously evaded and defeated by and under the mask of Benefit Societies, institutions which have cheated, cherished an given effect to the most dangerous combinations among the several journeymen of our district... 

This state of things cannot long exist, and if there is not shortly some legislative regulation adopted, your memorialists are deeply impressed with the apprehensions that absolute ruin will overtake the master manufacturers of the empire and the journeymen will assume an overbearing, oppressive and mischievous character that will be alike dangerous to the prosperity and tranquility of the country. 

Your memorialists are fully persuaded that the recent mischievous associations, disgraceful riots and ruinous burnings in the neighbourhoods of Nottingham and Manchester have had much of their origin in compacts of this nature, and as long as bodies of journeymen are allowed to constitute themselves into into societies under any denomination of benefit while the present laws of management of such societies exist, your memorialists have no hope of having the evils redressed which they have lamentably experienced." 

- (Home Office Document 42/133).

 Note the mention of Nottingham and Manchester as the locations of these "disgraceful riots" and "ruinous burnings". Manchester, Nottinghamshire, Lancashire and Yorkshire were the areas where the Luddites set about destroying the frames, thus making it clear that the paper refers directly to them.  Ultimately then, despite this hostility from the government being far from recent, the Luddites arguably exacerbated this type of attitude and provoked further government regulation of the benefit societies.  This harmed the ability for workers to fight for higher wages and organize, and potentially crippled future working class movements.

References/ Notes:

(1905) A. Aspinall, Early English Trade Unions, (This book contains reprints of Home Office paper 42/133 and many others.)
(2011) Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution; 1789-1848, Abacus, pp.55.
(2012) Charlotte Hodgman & Richard Jones, BBC History Magazine: Volume 13, no 5, May, pp.79.
(1976) Karl Marx, Capital: Volume One, A Critique of Political Economy, 4th Edition, Penguin Books, pp.554. (Marx goes on the criticize the Luddites for attacking the "material instruments of production" rather than the "form of society which utilizes those intruments." For more on Luddism from a Marxist perspective, visit Brendan M. Cooney's blog: Kapitalism101)
(1991) E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Penguin Books, pp.541.

Lenin, Marxism & the New Economic Policy

(The following are the answers I gave today for my second year exam on Russian history. It won't be identical but I think I can remember it almost entirely. When reading these you may notice slight inaccuracies or neglect for important points. Please remember this was written under exam conditions so I had no access to books or websites at hand. When I get my grades back I will put them here, that way this answer can be given as an example of either how or how not to get a decent grade.)


(Update 1st July 2012, I got a high 2.1 for these answers)

Was Lenin successful in his efforts to adapt Marxism to Russian conditions?

Lenin's attempts to adapt Marxism to the unique conditions of Russia were generally a failure, and those that can be considered a success were not "adaptations" in any meaningful sense of the word, but were on the contrary almost complete concessions to Narodnik ideology of peasant socialism.


To begin with, one of Lenin's main adaptations was the implementation of the peasantry into the revolution. Marx and Engels had entirely dismissed the peasants as part of the petite-bourgeoise and of no revolutionary capability. Lenin on the other hand called for a union between both agrarian and proletarian workers, an understandable move given that the peasantry roughly made up for 80 percent of the overall population at the time. Like the next adaptation to be discussed, this can largely be seen as a complete concession to the ideas of Alexander Herzen and the Narodniks who when agitating for an egalitarian revolution, had emphasised the role of the peasantry instead.

The next adaptation Lenin made was the role of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Lenin recognised alongside Marx and Engels that the Paris commune of 1871 had resulted in failure due to the inability (or unwillingness) of the French Communards to use suitable measures to quell counter-revolutionary sentiments. Marx in particular however, had partly been in agreement with Bakunin and the anarchists that the workers had the potential for revolutionary spontaneity and were capable of maintaining their own revolution. Lenin however, saw politics as a constant process of conquest and therefore urged for an elite group of intelligentsia to not only give orders and command the revolution from the top down, but to use brutal repression when the need arose. This advocacy of terror was reminiscent of the tactics advocated by the populists and once again may be seen as a concession to the ideas of an ideology at odds with Marxism. 
 Although it may have been a revision of Marxist theory, one could argue that it was successful on practical grounds. Indeed, it was remarkable that the Bolsheviks were able to overpower both the Black and White armies and defend their revolution for as long as they did. Nevertheless, the extent to which violence was used must be looked upon as a moral outrage. A perfect example of the lengths to which terror was used is the Kronstadt incident which resulted the deaths of thousands in response to their call for political reform. On Marxist grounds it may immediately be seen as necessary to protect the revolution against reactionary activity however the vast majority of those killed in the Kronstadt uprisings were anarchists, social democrats and other groups that would have been fairly ideologically sympathetic. Clearly then, this was anti-populist and cannot be viewed as any kind of success through a Marxist lens.


Perhaps Lenin's greatest failure was his attempt to bypass the bourgeoise revolution. According to the Marxist analysis of history, in order for socialism to take place there must already be an established industrial base brought about via the period of capitalism. Russia's proletariat then, according to orthodox Marxist such as Martov had to wait for the bourgeoise anti-monarchist revolution of February 1917 to mature, long before they could even consider establishing a worker's state. Lenin however, noting the conservative nature of the bourgeoise that made up the February revolution (many of whom were former aristocrats and elites from the Tsarist years), and insisting that a world wide proletarian revolution was imminent believed that there was no time to wait for such a process and that the provisional government therefore was illegitimate. 
 Russia's ability to mature industrially without (according to orthodox Marxism) the necessary stage of capitalism taking place was seen as a false hope, and as a result the New Economic Policy (NEP) was implemented in 1921 which made multiple market based concessions in order to help her economy recover.


Ultimately then, I conclude that those few "successful" adaptations Lenin made were in actual fact complete revisions of Marxist theory, and in substance were revivals of the ideas of his second (only to Marx) ideological patron saint Alexander Herzen. The rest of which had extreme social costs, one of which lead to the greatest capitalist concession in Russian history.


Describe the main characteristics of the mixed economy of the NEP years (1921-1928) and account for why this system was abandoned?

The main characteristic of the New Economic Policy from 1921-1928 was the concession to a capitalist mode of production which was ultimately incompatible with the more revolutionary segments of the Russian population. This conflict would lead eventually to the disappearance of the NEP.


Firstly, one of the main features of the NEP was the Soviet government's decision to replace obligatory agricultural produce seizure with a light taxation. Rather than the peasant population being forced to give up their surplus produce, they were granted permission to maintain and trade it at their own leisure. This resulted in the reappearance of multiple marketplaces throughout the countryside, and also saw the reemergence of a handful of "well to do peasants" referred to as Kulaks. In order to boost grain output, peasants were also granted lengthy but temporary tenure over small plots of land. Although the land was formally "nationalised" in practice this was a revival of private property. This type of concession was at odds with the communist government which despite various economic reforms, remained increasingly illiberal in the political sphere.

In addition to the agrarian reforms, there were also various capitalist concessions in regards to Russia's industrial base. Many former owners and managers were granted their old factories, as their expertise was needed in order to bring Russia out of her industrial malaise. Those who benefited from the NEP reforms were referred to as "Nepman" and were viewed with increasing suspicion by the politburo. Even those who advocated the NEP such as Stalin and Bukharin agreed that it was only to be temporary measure until their knowledge and expertise had spread and the economy could be centrally planned efficiently. 
 Because of this, there were still various important sectors of the economy still controlled by the state (such as transport and heavy machinery) that worked alongside the new private sector. However, even these sectors made concessions of their own. In order to incentivise harder work and increase industrial output, rewards were granted to favourable workers such as furniture, cars and home appliances. This can be seen as a concession to the desire of self betterment and the profit motive, something Adam Smith had long since agreed was more effectively harnessed by the free market.


 Economists such as Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek and Eugene Bohm-Bawerk had long since defended interest and profits as necessary for determining the appropriate direction of resources. In addition, Mises and Hayek had argued that economic planning was impossible without the use of a medium of exchange to aid calculation. These prophecies were proved completely accurate in Russia, not only by the Soviet's decision to abandon the utopian aim to do away with money and restore the old currency (ruble), but also by the opening up of a network of banks in 1922. These banks were state owned, nevertheless they were a concession of the need for interest in aiding the distribution of wealth.  Despite instability in the initial stages, hyperinflation was completely under control by the mid twenties.


The reforms made in agriculture successfully resulted in a return to prewar output by 1924-27, however   the concessions also made it difficult to encourage the transport of grain to the inner cities to feed the growing urban population. The Russian proletariat desired egalitarianism and an equality of fortunes, naturally therefore it was viewed with resentment and hostility that the peasants were able to better themselves and make profit while they were experiencing shared food shortages. 
These same sentiments were being increasingly mirrored within the politburo, and the initial plan to increase the size of Russia's industrial base by increasing the urban population was being undermined by the lack of trade from the peasantry to the cities.
 Although it was intended for the partial privatisation of industry to be a temporary stage, and for the state sector to quickly replace the private sector once enough expertise had been gathered from the former managers and elites, the former continued to lag behind relentlessly. The "left" wing of the politburo increasingly recognised that these two opposing modes of production could not exist alongside one another forever and that one had to disappear for the former to survive. By the thirties, all remnants of the NEP had disappeared until the state eventually controlled 97 percent of the means of production.


To conclude, the NEP represented a consistent concession to market measures which lead to successful improvements to the economy. However, there was an increasingly instability in the pairing of communist and capitalist policies.  Despite the successes in rebuilding the economy, the market reforms bred ideological hostility from the more orthodox sections of the politburo and the urban public which ultimately lead to its abolition.